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HAZARDOUS LIABILITY FOR SUCCESSOR OWNERS OF
TOXIC WASTE SITES: NEW YORK V. SHORE REALTY
CORP.
INTRODUCTION
Congress adopted the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compen-
sation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)' to stem the menace of aban-
doned hazardous waste sites. 2 CERCLA creates legal and administrative
procedures for the prevention and cleanup of hazardous chemical releases,
and provides a fund (the "Superfund") to finance cleanup costs.' Congress
passed CERCLA hastily in an eleventh-hour compromise, and the bill that
became the law has virtually no legislative history. 4 As a result, CERCLA
contains many ambiguities and omissions.
CERCLA suffers its most significant ambiguity in its liability section.
CERCLA authorizes the President to use Superfund resources to clean up
hazardous waste sites and spills, and to sue "responsible parties" for reim-
bursement of the cleanup costs.' Although the definition of "responsible
parties" in section 9607(a)6 is reasonably coherent, the section is ambiguous
I. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982).
2. See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. i, 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6119, 6120.
3. Id. The Superfund is financed by an excise tax imposed upon suppliers of petrochemical
feedstock, certain listed inorganic elements and compounds, and crude oil. 42 U.S.C. § 9631
(1982). See also 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611, 4612, 4661, 4662 (1982) (Internal Revenue Code provisions).
See generally Note, The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980: Is Joint and Several Liability the Answer to Superfund? 18 NEw ENG. L. REV.
109, 129 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Is Joint and Several Liability the Answer] (discuss-
ing Superfund's financing).
4. See Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1982) (compre-
hensive examination of CERCLA's legislative background).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606, 9607 (1982). Under CERCLA the President is empowered to
exercise "response authority" to actual or threatened releases of hazardous substances. Id. The
President has delegated this authority to several agencies, but primary responsibility lies with
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Exec. Order No. 12,316, 3 C.F.R. 168 (1982).
The subsequent suit against responsible parties is known as a "response suit."
6. Section 9607(a) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses
set forth in subsection (b) of this section
(I) the owner and operator of a vessel (otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States) or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
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about the standard of liability to be imposed upon targeted defendants.7
Most district courts have concluded that Congress intended for the provision
to impose joint and several liability upon responsible parties. 8 This standard
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment,
of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any party or entity,
at any facility owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such
hazardous substances, and,
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
disposal or treatment facilities or sites selected by such person, from which there
is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs,
of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Gov-
ernment or a State not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent
with the national contingency plan; and
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including
the reasonable costs of assessing such an injury, destruction, or loss resulting from
such a release.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982).
7. Section 9601(32) is the only section that addresses CERCLA liability. It states that
'liable' or 'liability' under [CERCLA] shall be construed to be the standard of liability which
obtains under Section 1321 of Title 33." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1982). Section 1321 is the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (the Clean Water Act). 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982). For an
explanation of the standard of liability under the Clean Water Act, see infra notes 40-41 and
accompanying text.
8. Numerous district courts have coped with the problem of how to construe the scope of
liability under CERCLA. See, e.g., Bulk Distrib. Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp.
1437 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (parties that work in concert to produce a single individual release or
threatened release are jointly and severally liable under CERCLA for a private party's response
costs, if applicable state law so provides); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 589 F.
Supp. 59 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (joint and several liability applicable under CERCLA where the
conduct of two or more persons combines to violate the statute); United States v. Northeastern
Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (chemical company, its officers, and
independent transporter jointly and severally liable for creation of alleged hazardous waste
disposal site for manufactured chemicals); United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp.
1249 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (Congress intended to impose joint and several liability under CERCLA,
but under a moderate application which apportions liability); United States v. South Carolina
Recycling & Disposal Inc., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1577 (D.S.C. 1984) (four hazardous
waste generators, two current property owners, site operator and a chemical company jointly
and severally liable for hazardous waste disposal at disposal site); United States v. Argent
Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1354 (D.N.M. 1984) (site owner jointly and severally liable
for its lessee's disposal of hazardous wastes at the site); United States v. Stringfellow, 20 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1905 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (joint and several liability not mandatory under
CERCLA, but supported persuasively by legislative history of Act and analogous statutory
language); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (joint and several liability
may be applied to site owners and hazardous waste generators, unless the defendants establish
reasonable basis for apportioning harm); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802
(S.D. Ohio 1983) (issue of joint and several liability under CERCLA to be determined by
developing federal common law; adopts Restatement (Second) of Torts approach, applying joint
and several liability to single and indivisible harm).
[Vol. 35:521
NEW YORK V. SHORE REALTY CORP.
was recently adopted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in New York v. Shore Realty Corp.9
In Shore Realty, the Second Circuit held that the owner of an abandoned
waste site was jointly and severally liable for the release of hazardous
substances into the environment.' 0 This standard of liability creates a wide
range of responsible parties under CERCLA. It imposes financial responsi-
bility for massive cleanup costs upon parties that have not contributed to
the pollution at a waste site. Joint and several liability enables governments
to single out identifiable contributors to waste sites and to force them to
fund entire cleanups, even if the defendant's contribution to the waste site
was modest.
This Note highlights the background of CERCLA and reviews the judicial
response to its liability provisions."I This Note then analyzes the Shore Realty
decision and discusses its impact on potentially liable parties. Finally, this
Note shows that the Second Circuit's construction of CERCLA's liability
standards destroys the ability of successor owners of waste sites to minimize
their liability. The stiff liability standards set out in Shore Realty will interfere
with private efforts to finance cleanups through contribution, settlement and
insurance.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Legislative History of CERCLA
Congress enacted CERCLA after almost two years of debate. CERCLA
recognizes the health and environmental risks of hazardous waste sites and
supplants the inadequate statutory mechanisms formerly available to remedy
such violations.' 2 CERCLA is not principally a regulatory program. It does
not create a federal hazardous waste bureaucracy; it instead creates civil
liability for current or former owners of waste sites and authorizes a Super-
fund to finance the removal of hazardous wastes in the environment."
9. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
10. Id. at 1037, 1043-44.
II. For a synopsis of recent court decisions regarding current CERCLA issues, see 15 THE
LAW. BRIEF 16-19 (April 30, 1985).
12. See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 6120-25. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976), currently provides a "cradle-to-grave" regulatory scheme for the
movement of hazardous wastes, but does not cover inactive or abandoned hazardous waste
sites. In 1979, it was estimated that as many as 30,000-50,000 such sites existed, of which 1,200-
2,000 presented serious public health risks. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONO. & AD. NEWS 6120. Especially in light of the disaster at
Love Canal, New York, Congress recognized the need for additional legislation given the
inadequacies of the RCRA and other previously-enacted air and water pollution legislation. Id.
13. Rodburg, The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, 128 PRAc. L. INST. 233, 234 (1982).
19851
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
The cleanup of hazardous wastes takes place on several fronts. First,
CERCLA mandates that owners of waste facilities'" report the release of
wastes into the environment to the National Response Center. 5 Second,
CERCLA makes waste site owners and operators civilly liable under federal
law for the release, or threatened release, of hazardous substances into the
environment.' 6 A past or current owner of a waste site may be ordered to
clean the site, or a government agency may enter the property to conduct
the cleanup directly. In addition, if the United States or any state government
incurs an expense to respond to the release, then it may sue a variety of
responsible parties to recover the expenses. 7 Finally, CERCLA authorizes
the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 8 to remove hazardous
wastes from a waste site when the owner or operator of a site has not acted
to remove the wastes.' 9 Through the Superfund, federal revenues are used
to pay for waste cleanups. ,0 CERCLA also imposes liability on parties
connected with the waste site for reimbursement,2' and authorizes the EPA
to seek whatever injunctive relief is necessary to abate "imminent and
substantial" danger to the public from an actual or threatened release."
The standard and scope of liability to be imposed on site owners for cleanup
expenses is not settled in the statute or the legislative history. Section 9607
14. Section 9601(9) defines "Facility" as:
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any
pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon,
impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or
aircraft, or
(B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed
of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does not include any consumer
product in consumer use or any vessel...
42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1982).
15. The National Response Center (NRC) was established under the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1251 (1982). Section 9602(b) presently provides that a reportable quantity of one
pound, or the reportable quantities established for hazardous substances pursuant to § 1321(b)(4)
of the Clean Water Act, will be deemed the quantity of release that requires notification under
CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. § 9602 (1982).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(cX3) (1982).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(aX4) (1982).
18. See supra note 5.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(aXI) (1982). CERCLA defines "remove" or "removal" as:
[Sluch actions as may be necessary taken in the event of the threat of release of
hazardous substances into the environment, such actions as may be necessary to
monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances,
the disposal of removed material, or the taking of such other actions as may be
necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare
or to the environment, which may otherwise result from a release or threat of
release.
Id. § 9601(23).
20. Id. § 9631.
21. Id. §9604.
22. Id. § 9606.
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states without elaboration that responsible parties "shall be liable for" costs
of removal of wastes and damages.23 The only reference to the standard or
scope of liability found elsewhere in the statute is in section 9601(32), which
provides that the standard of liability under CERCLA tracks the standard of
liability under the Federal Water Pollution Act (the Clean Water Act). 4 Finally,
the statute provides only limited defenses to liability under section 9607(b). A
defendant is not liable if a release of waste is caused by an act of God, an act
of war, or a third party unrelated to the defendant; the "third party" defense
is good only if the defendant can prove that "he exercised due care with respect
to the hazardous substance" and that "he took precautions against foreseeable
acts or omissions of such third parties."
25
The legislative history of CERCLA is also ambiguous on the standard and
scope of liability. The final version of the act represents an eleventh-hour
compromise between three bills. The act was assembled in the final days of
the Ninety-sixth Congress primarily by Senate leaders and sponsors of its
earlier versions.2 6 Although the original bills contained clauses that imposed
a standard of strict liability and a scope of joint and several liability, Congress
deleted these clauses from the final version. 27 A key sponsor of the compro-
mise, Senator Jennings Randolph, stated that the scope of liability for
23. Id. § 9607.
24. See supra note 7.
25. Section 9607(b)(3) provides that there shall be no liability for a person otherwise liable
who can establish that the release of hazardous substances was caused solely by:
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the
defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual
relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant (except where the
sole contractual arrangement arises from a published tariff and acceptance for
carriage by a common carrier by rail), if the defendant establishes by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous
substance concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such hazardous
substance, in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precau-
tions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party and the conse-
quences that could foreseeably result from such acts or omissions ....
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982).
26. The three bills may be found at H.R. 85, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 126 CONG. Rac. 26,336
(1980); H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CoNG. REC. 26,774 (1980); S. 1480, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess., 126 CONG. REC. 30,908 (1980). See Grad, supra note 4, at 3, 10 (CERCLA was a
compromise). Senators Randolph and Stafford jointly drafted the final compromise version of
CERCLA, referred to as the Stafford-Randolph bill. Id. at 21-29.
27. After considering H.R. 7020, the House adopted an amendment proposed by Repre-
sentative Albert Gore that provided a formula for apportioning damages. 126 CONG. REC.
26,781 (1980). However, the Senate version deleted any such formula. Note, The Right to
Contribution For Response Costs Under CERCLA, 60 NOTRE DAME LAW. 345, 348 (1985)
(hereinafter cited as Note, Right to Contribution]. One partisan-minded commentator remarked
that the controversial provision for joint and several liability was deleted as part of a final
compromise to pass the act before the Reagan administration took office. Dore, The Standard
of Civil Liability for Hazardous Waste Disposal Activity: Some Quirks of Superfund, 57 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 260, 268 (1981).
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responsible parties under the act would be governed by "traditional and
evolving" common law principles. 8 He also stated that the compromise
retained a strict liability standard for cleanup costs against those connected
with waste sites.2 9 This standard was drawn from reference to judicial
construction of section 311 of the Clean Water Act.3 0 Representative James
Florio made similar statements about liability under CERCLA when he
introduced the original House bills." Conversely, Senator Jesse Helms stated
that Congress had deleted the provision for joint and several liability because
Congress opposed that standard; Congressional opponents of CERCLA
believed that the courts would apportion liability unfairly under that stand-
ard. 2 The confusion over how to reconcile the statutory language of CER-
CLA, the omission of express language on liability, and the statements on
the floor of Congress has spawned much controversy and litigation. 3
B. Judicial Treatment of CERCLA's Liability Provision
1. The Range of Responsible Parties
Section 9607(a) defines four classes of persons who can be held liable in
a response suit for the cleanup costs of a hazardous waste site.3 4 Defendants
28. In discussing the compromise bill, Senator Randolph stated:
It is intended that issues of liability not resolved by this act, if any, shall be governed
by traditional evolving principles of common law. An example is joint and several
liability. Any reference to these terms has been deleted, and the liability of joint
tortfeasors will be determined under common or previous statutory law.
126 CoNG. REc. 30,932 (1980).
29. Id.
30. Id. See infra notes 40-51.
31. 126 CONG. REC. 31,965 (1980). See also Grad, supra note 4, at 30 (although strict
liability was not mentioned in the statute, Congressman Florio assured the members that it was
continued by reference to section 311 of the Clean Water Act).
32. 126 CoNG. REC. 30,972 (1980). Senator Helms described the intent of the deletion as
follows:
Retention of joint and several liability in S. 1480 received intense and well-
deserved criticism from a number of sources, since it could impose financial
responsibility for massive costs and damages awards on persons who contributed
only minimally (if at all) to a release or injury. Joint and several liability for costs
and damages was especially pernicious in S. 1480, not only because of the exceedingly
broad categories of persons subject to liability and the wide array of damages
available, but also because it was coupled with an industry-based fund. Those
contributing to the fund will frequently be paying for conditions they had no
responsibility in creating or even contributing to. To adopt a joint and several
liability scheme on top of this would have been grossly unfair.
The drafters of the Stafford-Randolph substitute have recognized this unfairness,
and the lack of wisdom in eliminating any meaningful link between culpable conduct
and financial responsibility. Consequently, all references to joint and several liability
in the bill have been deleted.
Id.
33. See supra note 8.
34. These classes include current owners and operators of facilities, past owners and
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in CERCLA response suits have unsuccessfully sought to be dismissed on
the ground that they did not fall within one of the four statutory classes of
responsible parties. Recent district court decisions have rejected such claims
and have broadly interpreted section 9607(a).
CERCLA liability has been imposed on a wide range of defendants.35 For
example, a lessee of a hazardous waste site has been held liable as an
"owner" because the lessee maintained control and exercised responsibility
over the use of the property. 6 The lessee stood in the shoes of the property
owner for CERCLA purposes. Lessee liability can also be imputed to land-
lords; one court found a former site owner liable when his lessee disposed
of hazardous wastes at the site." Another court found an officer of a
chemical company liable as an "arranger for disposal," because the officer
arranged with an independent contractor to transport hazardous wastes to a
operators at the time of disposal, arrangers of hazardous waste transportation and disposal,
and transporters of hazardous wastes for disposal. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982). For the full text
of § 9607(a), see supra note 6.
In hazardous waste suits, the plaintiffs usually name all generators, transporters, and disposers
of waste connected with a waste site as defendants. Each of these defendants will have different
levels of involvement with the release of hazardous waste at a site. Nevertheless, the Superfund
does not provide a method for allocating liability among these parties. For example, the statute
does not provide explicitly for limited liability for generators who deposit some, but not all,
of the waste at a site. Such parties may be held liable for all of the response costs and damages
at that site. Note, Joint and Several Liability For Hazardous Waste Releases Under Superfund,
68 VA. L. REV. 1157, 1162 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Joint and Several Liability].
35. See supra note 8.
36. United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1577, 1581 (D.S.C. 1984). In a response suit, one defendant, Columbia Organic Chemical
Company (COCC), was held liable for response costs in the cleanup of a hazardous waste
disposal site near Columbia, South Carolina. COCC had leased the site from the owner, and
it subsequently sublet a portion of it. The court held that both lessees, along with the property
owners, should be considered "owners" for the purposes of imposing liability under § 9607(a).
Id. at 1581. The court also held the lessee liable as an "operator," an "arranger," and a
"transporter," because it was involved in the hazardous waste disposal business. Id. at 1581-
84. The fact that COCC sublet a portion of the site did not reduce its liability.
37. United States v. Cauffman, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2167 (C.D. Cal. 1984). At the
time of the suit, the defendants did not own the site, and the wastes on the site were disposed
of by the owner-defendant's lessee. The court held that §§ 9607(a)(1) and (2) imposed strict
liability on current and previous owners of hazardous waste facilities. Id. The defendants
accordingly fit within the statutory classifications of responsible persons. The court believed
that there was nothing in the statute that required the government to allege or prove proximate
causation. Id.
But see Cadillac Fairview/California Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1108 (C.D. Cal. 1984). In Cadillac Fairview/California, owners of a waste site sought declaratory
judgment that a party who owned the site before the plaintiff, and knew of but neglected the
presence of hazardous wastes, was liable to the plaintiff under CERCLA. The court held that
under CERCLA, the liability of prior owners is expressly limited by the words "ownership at
the time of disposal" in § 9607(a)(2). Therefore, a defendant who did not own the site at the
time of disposal could not be liable. Id. at 1113.
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disposal site." Finally, a waste generator was found liable under CERCLA
even though it had transferred legal ownership of hazardous material to a
disposal company at the time of pick-up for disposal. 9
2. The Standard and Scope of Liability
The only express reference in CERCLA to a standard of liability is found
in section 9601(32), which provides that liability under CERCLA shall be
assessed under the same standard as liability under the Clean Water Act."
Because courts have uniformally imposed strict liability under the Clean
Water Act, the district courts have unanimously concluded that Congress
intended to impose a strict liability standard under CERCLA.4"
38. United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co. (NEPACCO), 579 F. Supp. 823
(W.D. Mo. 1984). In NEPACCO, the government sued a chemical company, its officers, and
an independent contractor connected with the company's waste disposal for damages and
response costs under CERCLA. The court held that the company was a "person" under
CERCLA, and that it could be held liable for contracting to transport and dispose of the
hazardous wastes. Id. at 847. The company's officers argued that they could not be held
personally liable for the corporation's acts, and that they neither owned nor possessed the
hazardous wastes to which their corporation had ownership rights. The court still found the
officers liable as "arrangers," because they had knowledge and supervision of the disposals.
Id. The court's findings were based on a liberal interpretation of the term "persons." The
court construed the term to include both employees and corporations. Id. at 848. Furthermore,
the court held the officers liable as owners and operators because they were major stockholders
in the closely held corporation, and because they jointly owned and operated the plant. Id.
39. United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (D.C. Pa. 1983). The defendants in Wade
argued that the government could not establish a causal relationship between the defendants'
wastes and the government's cleanup costs. The court rejected the defendants' arguments,
holding that the statute should be liberally construed and should not be read to require that
the government "fingerprint" wastes for individual violators. Id. at 1332. Rather, the court
held that the government need only prove that the defendants' wastes were dumped at the site.
Id.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1982). Speaking on the Senate floor, Senator Jennings Randolph
stated: "Unless otherwise provided in this act, the standard of liability is intended to be the
same as that provided in section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C.
1321)[sic]. I understand this to be a standard of strict liability." 126 CONG. REc. 30,932 (1980).
See also Tripp, Liability Issues in Litigation Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act, 52 UMKC L. REV. 364, 372 (1982) (discussion of strict liability
standard under CERCLA).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 843-
44 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. Argent Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1354, 1356
(D.N.M. 1984); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1113-14 (D.N.J. 1983); United States
v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 804-08 (S.D. Ohio 1983); City of Philadelphia v.
Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1143 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
CERCLA's strict liability standard is subject to limited affirmative defenses, as set out in 42
U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1982). Section 9607(b) states, in pertinent part:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person otherwise
liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or
threat of release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom
[Vol. 35:521
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Because the district courts impose strict liability under CERCLA, some
courts have openly questioned whether it is fair to make a few identifiable
parties liable for an expensive cleanup. The standard approach that district
courts take to this problem is a straight-forward, mechanical application of
joint and several liability. A few courts have suggested an alternative: that
joint and several liability would be withdrawn if it would cause undue
hardship on the responsible parties, and that damages should be apportioned
among the parties.
The standard approach is epitomized by United States v. Chem-Dyne.42
In this case, the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio held that
the scope of liability under CERCLA should be derived by reference to
federal common law. 3 The court stated that Congress deleted the joint and
several liability provision in CERCLA to avoid creating a mandatory legis-
lative standard in inappropriate circumstances.44 Accordingly, the court de-
termined that CERCLA authorized application of joint and several liability
against responsible parties for cleanup costs. 45 The court adopted the Res-
tatement (Second) of Torts approach, which imposes joint and several lia-
bility where two or more persons cause a single and indivisible harm. 46 The
court concluded that liability is not joint and several only where there exists
a reasonable basis for division founded on contribution.4 7 The majority of
district courts have adopted the Chem-Dyne/Restatement approach. 48
By contrast, in United States v. A & F Materials Co., 49 another district
court stated that damages should be apportioned among responsible parties,
although it reserved the power to impose joint and several liability on
were caused solely by-
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the
defendant ....
Id.
42. 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
43. "[Tlhe delineation of a uniform federal rule of decision is consistent with the legislative
history and policies of CERCLA . Id.
44. Id. at 810.
45. Id. The court noted the similarities between the liability provisions of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), which provides for the application of joint and several
liability, and CERCLA. Nevertheless, the court stated: "While the complementary policies and
comparable language of FWPCA and CERCLA are persuasive points, a blanket adoption of
the joint and several liability standard of § 1321 would be inconsistent with the legislative
history of CERCLA." Id.
46. Id. See RESTATEMENr (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1979).
47. 572 F. Supp. at 810.
48. See, e.g., United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59, 62-63 (W.D. Mo.
1984); United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1577, 1584 (D.S.C. 1984); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331-34 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
49. 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. 111. 1984).
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defendants who were unable to prove their level of contribution." CERCLA's
legislative history indicated to the court that Congress believed too rigid an
application of joint and several liability would impose liability on remote
responsible parties, regardless of their actual role in creating the waste site.
The court concluded that its compromise approach was consistent with
Congressional intent."
II. THE SHORE REALTY DECISION
In New York v. Shore Realty Corp.,2 the defendant bought a hazardous
waste disposal site in Glenwood Landing, New York, to use for a condo-
minium development. The defendant knew that the present tenants operated
an illegal hazardous waste storage facility on the site." The site contained
approximately 700,000 gallons of hazardous chemicals, most of which were
located in five large tanks.5 4 Before Shore Realty consummated its purchase,
it commissioned an environmental study of the site. Shore Realty's environ-
mental consultant, WTM Management Corporation (WTM), reported that
the waste facilities on the site were dilapidated. WTM's report also noted
that there had been several hazardous waste spills at the site, including a
significant one in 1978. Although the current tenant had attempted to clean
up the spills, the report revealed that there was still groundwater contami-
nation. WTM concluded that if the current tenant ceased its disposal oper-
ation and left the material on the site, the new owners would be left with a
"potential time bomb." 5
In spite of WTM's report, Shore Realty took title to the site in October
of 1983, and evicted the waste disposal tenant in January of 1984. In the
four months before its eviction, the tenant added nearly 90,000 gallons of
50. Id. at 1256. The court adopted Representative Albert Gore's amendment to the original
House bill, H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. 26,781 (1980). The Gore
amendment states that damages should be apportioned according to:
(i) the ability of the parties to demonstrate that their contribution to a discharge,
release or disposal of a hazardous waste can be distinguished;
(ii) the amount of the hazardous waste involved;
(iii) the degree of toxicity of the hazardous waste involved;
(iv) the degree of involvement by the parties in the generation, transportation,
treatment, storage, or disposal of the hazardous waste;
(v) the degree of care exercised by the parties with respect to the hazardous waste
concerned, taking into account the characteristics of such hazardous waste; and
(vi) the degree of cooperation by the parties with Federal, State, or local officials
to prevent any harm to the public health or the environment.
Id.
51. Id. See also United States v. Stringfellow, 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1905 (C.D. Cal.
1984) (adopting A & F Materials apportionment approach).
52. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
53. Id. at 1037.
54. Id. at 1038.
55. Id. at 1038-39.
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hazardous chemicals to the tanks. A state inspection conducted in January
of 1984, two days before Shore Realty evicted the tenant, revealed that the
drums of chemicals were deteriorating and leaking. The tenant did not clean
up the site before it vacated, and the site's condition was admittedly as bad
or worse than when WTM conducted its report. Subsequently, Shore Realty
did nothing to remove the hundreds of thousands of gallons of hazardous
wastes in the deteriorated and leaking tanks. 6
The State of New York brought suit against Shore Realty and Donald
LeoGrande, its sole officer and shareholder, in the District Court of the
Eastern District of New York." The state sought an injunction-to order
Shore Realty to clean the site-and damages under CERCLA for its response
costs." The complaint also alleged pendant state law nuisance claims. On a
motion for summary judgment, the district court held Shore Realty liable
for the state's response costs and awarded the state injunctive relief both
under CERCLA and on a finding that the site constituted a public nuisance
under state law.59 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
remanded the case for a clearer holding.6 On remand, the district court
concluded that CERCLA did not authorize injunctive relief, and the court
based a new injunction solely on state public nuisance law. 6' The district
court sustained a verdict for response costs under CERCLA.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's second decision, holding
Shore Realty and LeoGrande liable for the state's response costs under
CERCLA. 62 The court also denied the state injunctive relief against Shore
Realty under CERCLA, but upheld the district court's issuance of a per-
manent injunction based on New York public nuisance law. 63
The court of appeals found Shore Realty liable for response costs under
CERCLA as a current landowner, under section 9607(a)(1). 64 Shore Realty
56. Id. at 1039.
57. See 15 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1154 (1985) (discussing New York v. Shore Realty Corp., No.
84-7925 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1984) (oral opinion)). In an earlier published ruling, the district
court for the Eastern District of New York held that the state need not sue all defendants to
collect full damages. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1430, 1431
(E.D.N.Y. 1984). Shore Realty had moved to dismiss the state's complaint for failure to join
an indispensible party under to FED. R. Cirv. P. 12(b)(7). Id. at 1430. Shore Realty and
LeoGrande claimed that the state had to join over one hundred generators and former owners
in the suit. 15 Env't Rep. (BNA) at 1155. For a complete discussion of the district court's
decision, see infra text accompanying notes 84-104.
58. The state incurred response costs when it assessed the conditions of the site and supervised
the removal of the drums of hazardous wastes. 759 F.2d at 1043.
59. 15 Env't Rep. (BNA) at 1155.
60. For an account of the remanded decision, see 759 F.2d at 1037.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1043.
63. Id. at 1049-51.
64. Id. at 1044. Section 9607(a)(1) provides "the owner and operator of a vessel (otherwise
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States) or a facility" is liable under CERCLA. 42
U.S.C. § 9607(aXf) (1982).
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had argued that section 9607(a)(1) was not intended to include all owners,
but only those who under section 9607(a)(2) owned the property "at the
time of disposal." 65 After examining CERCLA and its legislative history,
the court found that Congress intended section 9607(a)(1) to hold liable all
current landowners and operators; section 9607(a)(2) applied only to past
owners and operators "at the time of disposal." The court concluded that
Shore Realty was liable under section 9607(a)(1) as a current owner. 6 The
65. Section 9607(a)(2) provides that "any person who at the time of disposal of any
hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were
disposed of . . ." is liable under CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1982).
66. 759 F.2d at 1044. The court also stated that a site's inclusion on the National Priority
List (NPL) was not a necessary condition for the state to recover response costs, and that the
state could sue responsible parties for remedial and removal costs, if such efforts were consistent
with the National Contingency Plan (NCP). Id. at 1045.46.
The NCP is created in § 9605(8)(B), which provides in part:
[Tihe [EPA] shall list as part of the plan national priorities among the known
releases or threatened releases throughout the United States and shall revise the list
no less often than annually .... To the extent practicable, at least four hundred
of the highest priority facilities shall be designated individually and shall be referred
to as the 'top priority among known response targets', and, to the extent practicable,
shall include among the one hundred highest priority facilities at least one such
facility from each State which shall be the facility designated by the State as
presenting the greatest danger to public health or welfare or the environment ....
Other priority facilities or incidents may be listed singly or grouped for response
priority purposes ....
Following publication of the revised national contingency plan, the response to and
actions to minimize damage from hazardous substances releases shall, to the greatest
extent possible, be in accordance with the provisions of the plan.
42 U.S.C. § 9605(8XB) (1982).
Section 9605 provides that the EPA shall revise the NCP to accommodate the removal of oil
and hazardous substances discovered to pose an immediate threat to human health. The NCP
sets priorities for the federal response to releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and
contaminants. 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1982).
Shore Realty argued that, because the site was not listed on the NPL, the state's action was
inconsistent with the NCP and that Shore Realty was not liable under § 9607(a). 759 F.2d at
1045. Shore Realty based its argument upon the language in § 9607(a)(4), which provides that
responsible parties shall be liable for "[ajll costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the
United States Government or a State not inconsistent with the national contingency plan ....
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1982). The court concluded, to the contrary, that this clause referred
only to the authority of courts to award a state damages from the Superfund. Whether a state
can get money from the Superfund had, for the court, no relevance to the issue of the
defendants' liability in this case.
The court also relied on CERCLA's legislative history to support this conclusion. It reviewed
the changes made in CERCLA's final compromise version and found that no legislator men-
tioned that NPL listing would be a requirement for removal actions under the NCP. Id. at
1047. Finally, the court stated that to limit the scope of the NPL listing was consistent with
CERCLA's purposes. It made sense for the federal government to limit to the NPL listed sites
only those long-term remedial efforts that were federally funded, because the states supposedly
had more flexibility acting on their own. Id.
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court reasoned that if Shore Realty's construction of the section were adopted,
it would create a loophole in liability under CERCLA: it would allow current
owners of abandoned waste facilities to avoid liability, as long as the waste
facility did not operate under their ownership. This would defeat the policy
behind CERCLA when the waste dumpers or producers cannot be located
or are judgment-proof.6 7
The court of appeals also addressed the interplay between CERCLA and
state law. The court held that the state was entitled to an award for cleanup
costs under CERCLA; it reasoned that Congress did not intend to leave
cleanup under CERCLA "solely in the hands of the federal government. '68
Rather, the state or political subdivision could contract with the EPA to
take action on a cost-sharing basis. 69 In contrast to the award of costs, the
court did not extend the injunctive relief available under CERCLA to the
state. The court stated that CERCLA's statutory scheme and legislative
history reflected Congress's intent not to authorize such relief.7°
III. ANALYsIs
The Shore Realty decision is consistent with recent district court decisions
regarding the liability of waste site owners under CERCLA. The court
broadly construed the statutory definition of a responsible party and affirmed
widely-held judicial findings that Congress intended to impose joint and
several liability under CERCLA. The court nevertheless failed to cope with
the issue of whether courts should impose joint and several liability under
67. 759 F.2d at 1045. The court found that Congress intended responsible parties to be
strictly liable under CERCLA, even though Congress deleted an explicit provision for strict
liability from the compromise version of the bill. Id. at 1044.
The court also noted that, regardless of the standard of liability under CERCLA, Shore
Realty had a contractual relationship with the prior owners and that causality was therefore
not a relevant issue. Id. at 1048 n.23.
68. Id. at 1041. Section 9604(c)(3) provides that, "The [EPA] shall grant the State a credit
against the share of the costs for which it is responsible under this paragraph for any documented
direct out-of-pocket non-Federal funds expended or obligated by the State ...." 42 U.S.C. §
9604(C)(3) (1982). New York has established its own mini-Superfund, which provides that the
state may take remedial action but that the fund may not be used for costs covered by CERCLA.
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 27-1301 to 27-1321 (McKinney 1984).
69. 759 F.2d at 1041.
70. Id. at 1049. The court first focused on § 9606, which expressly authorizes the EPA to
seek injunctive relief to abate "an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance from
a facility." 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1982).
The court reasoned that a construction of § 9607 that gave the states the authority to seek
injunctions would make the language of § 9606 superfluous. 759 F.2d at 1049. The court also
found that only the EPA had the power to seek injunctions under CERCLA. Id. at 1049-50.
Therefore, the court was not willing to grant to the state such power. Finally, although a
discussion of the court's holding about state public nuisance law is beyond the scope of this
article, by awarding the state its response costs under CERCLA while simultaneously granting
the state injunctive relief under state public nuisance law, the court in effect gave to the state
the powers granted to the EPA under CERCLA.
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CERCLA, as set out in Chem-Dyne, 7' or whether CERCLA liability should
be apportioned.
A. Responsible Parties
In holding Shore Realty liable for response costs, the Second Circuit set
a liability standard under CERCLA that in theory should facilitate the
financing of waste cleanups. The court's broad definition of responsible
parties is consistent with the decisions of most other district courts. 72 The
court reasoned that a narrower definition, one that excluded successor owners
of waste sites from liability, would too often place the only solvent parties
connected with a waste site beyond the reach of CERCLA."
The court's construction of CERCLA places a duty on potential purchasers
of sites or facilities holding hazardous wastes to take measures to contain
and remove the wastes. The burden is on such purchasers, under the limited
affirmative defense provided by section 9607(b)(3), to prove that they exer-
cised due care and took precautions against foreseeable third-party acts or
omissions.74 On the facts, the court was correct to conclude that Shore Realty
was not entitled to avail itself of the defense because it failed to take
adequate precautions against the third-party acts." However, the court went
further than CERCLA requires by holding that Shore Realty was liable for
the whole cleanup, rather than merely the cleanup of waste that escaped
after Shore Realty purchased the property.16
The court's broad application of joint and several liability severely limits
the main defense available to site owners under CERCLA. The court held
that Shore Realty could not assert the "third-party" acts defense to protect
itself from liability for acts performed by third parties against previous site
owners. By this line of reasoning, third-party acts performed against previous
owners are not within the scope of the defense. Thus, any defendant could
be held liable for all response costs under section 9607(a), even defendants
who acted in good faith to remedy the acts or omissions of irresponsible
third parties, and who guarded against future third-party misconduct. This
conclusion is not supported by the language of section 9607(b)(3), which
does not refer to a time period for third-party acts or omissions. 7
71. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
73. 759 F.2d at 1045. The court cited legislative history that supported the conclusion that
persons who dump or store hazardous wastes often are unidentifiable, missing or judgment-
proof.
74. See Angelo, The Expanding Scope of Liability for Environmental Damage and Its
Impact on Business Transactions, 8 CoRP. L. REV. 101 (1985) (discussion of protective measures
available to potential purchasers or site owners).
75. 759 F.2d at 1039, 1045. Shore Realty's argument that it took adequate precautions is
weak in view of its total inaction.
76. 759 F.2d at 1048.
77. See supra note 25.
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The court possibly reasoned that its construction of 9607(b)(3) supported
Congress's expectation that successor owners of waste sites, like Shore Realty,
would be liable for cleanup costs. However, the court's narrow construction
of the section impinges on another goal of CERCLA: to encourage private
parties to take responsibility for the cleanup of a site."t The court implied
that a party can be held liable for the entire cleanup of a hazardous waste
site based solely on its acquisition of the site. To protect themselves from
CERCLA liability, parties will conduct environmental studies of sites prior
to purchasing real estate. If such investigations reveal environmental prob-
lems, they will refrain from purchasing the site rather than undertake an
expensive cleanup and risk incalculable CERCLA liability. Because the courts
have placed excessive liability on successor owners of waste sites, no one
will undertake to improve those sites voluntarily, and the government will
bear the entire expense of cleaning waste from abandoned property.
B. Standard and Scope of Liability
To find strict liability under CERCLA, the Shore Realty court relied on
section 9601(32) and the language of unpassed versions of CERCLA. The
court stated that the section 9601(32) reference to the standard of liability
under the Clean Water Act, read along with the other versions of CERCLA,
supported the conclusion that Congress intended to impose strict liability
under CERCLA.79 But, as one commentator has critically noted, the cases
that establish liability under the Clean Water Act involved parties "intimately
involved in the -challenged pollution activity." In contrast, some defendants
under CERCLA may not have contributed to the waste dump at all.8 0 After
an examination of CERCLA's legislative history, the commentator proposed
that strict liability should be confined to those "who engaged in substantial
and purposeful hazardous waste disposal activity for commercial profit
''81
The Shore Realty court also held Donald LeoGrande jointly and severally
liable with Shore Realty under both CERCLA and New York public nuisance
law.8 2 The court did not discuss the basis of this conclusion in its opinion.
78. See Rodburg, supra note 13, at 234.
79. 759 F.2d at 1042. This conclusion is consistent with previous district court decisions,
see supra note 42, as well as with CERCLA's legislative history.
80. See Dore, supra note 27, at 275-77.
81. Id. at 276. This commentator concluded that many "responsible parties" may be only
remotely connected to the waste found on a site: "Automatic application of strict liability to
parties whose conduct was substantially unrelated to the present danger posed by the hazardous
waste release or who did not obtain commercial benefit from their conduct, does not appear
to be compelled by the environmental concerns which gave rise to Superfund." Id.
In this case, Shore Realty was not involved directly with the dumping and storing of the
hazardous wastes on the site, but it did purchase the site for commercial use in full awareness
of the presence of the waste. In any event, the court correctly applied a strict liability standard.
82. 759 F.2d at 1037.
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Consequently, the decision creates binding precedent for imposing joint and
several liability under CERCLA, but does not provide judicial standards for
the lower courts to follow. Instead, lower courts will have to look to the
district court's reasoning.8 1 Unfortunately, the district court did not determine
what standard of liability should apply to the defendants at that "early stage
of the litigation.18 4 The district court stated that joinder of other potentially
responsible parties was not required, and that other courts which had con-
sidered the issue had almost unanimously held that Congress intended that
courts impose joint and several liability on a case-by-case basis.8
In dicta, the district court discussed the significance of the absence of an
express provision for joint and several liability from the final version of
CERCLA. The district court observed that, according to ordinary canons of
statutory construction, the decision to remove language from the final version
of a bill should be viewed as legislative intent to exclude a construction of
the statute that reflects the object of the deleted language.8 6 However, the
district court relied on previous decisions that addressed the absence of an
express provision. The court concluded that Congress deleted the provision
only to forestall the use of joint and several liability in inappropriate
situations, not to proscribe it completely.17
In Shore Realty, the district court relied on the floor debates and statements
of Senators Stafford and Randolph. The court found that the statements
expressed Congress's intent to leave liability under CERCLA claims open to
the common law.88 In support of its reading of CERCLA's history, the court
noted that the only statements opposing its interpretation were those of
Senator Helms.89 The court's blunt dismissal of Helms's statements is not
justifiedY0 The final bill was a compromise from which Congress deleted the
provision regarding joint and several liability to gain waivering members'
approval and to secure the bill's passage. 91 Therefore, Senator Helms's
statements are entitled to more weight than the district court gave them.
Congress's decision to drop a provision for joint and several liability arguably
83. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1430 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
84. Id. at 1432.
85. Id.
.86. Id. at 1431.
87. Id. The courts that have reached this conclusion have invariably applied joint and
several liability. But see United States v. Argent Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1356, 1357
(D.N.M. 1984) (court denied government's motion for joint and several liability because of
existence of genuine issues as to divisibility of harm and existence of a reasonable basis for
apportioning damages).
88. 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1431-32.
89. Id. at 1431 n.6.
90. See Price, Dividing the Costs of Hazardous Waste Site Cleanups Under Superfund: Is
Joint and Several Liability Appropriate? 52 UMKC L. REV. 339, 345-46 (1984).
91. Id. See also Dore, supra note 27, at 268 (controversial provisions of CERCLA were
eliminated to speed passage of waste bill before the Reagan administration took office).
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demonstrates Congress's intent not to impose such liability under CERCLA.92
Furthermore, the district court's interpretation of CERCLA's legislative
history ignores the common law setting that underlay the debate to impose
joint and several liability. Senator Randolph stated that liability issues not
resolved by the Act, such as joint and several liability, were to be governed
according to "traditional and evolving principles of common law." 93 Under
common law, liability for pollution damages was traditionally apportioned
among those who demonstrably contributed to the pollution. 94 Where the
polluter's acts were indivisible, the courts applied the common law principle
of joint and several liability described in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 9
However, the traditional common law rule in environmental cases is that
pollution by its nature is divisible.9 The Chem-Dyne9 decision, which was
cited by the district court in Shore Realty to support its imposition of joint
and several liability under CERCLA, failed to recognize this common law
rule. 98 Senator Randolph's reference to traditional common law principles
arguably demonstrated Congress's intent to apportion liability under
CERCLA. 99
92. Price, supra note 90, at 345-46. On the matter of whether § 9607 was intended to adopt
joint and several liability, one commentator stated: "Superfund does not expressly address this
issue. Indeed, it is clear from the legislative history that Congress did not intend to address it,
but to allow it to be resolved by the courts according to common law principles." Hall, The
Problem of Unending Liability for Hazardous Wastes Management, 38 Bus. LAW. 593, 603
(1983).
93. 126 CONG. REc. 30,932 (1980).
94. See Price, supra note 90, at 352.
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1979).
96. Price, supra note 90, at 352; Note, Is Joint and Several Liability the Answer, supra
note 3, at 139. But see Note, Joint and Several Liability Under CERCLA-United States v.
Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983), 57 TEMP. L.Q. 885, 902-04 (1984)
(discussing reform of traditional common law rules in some jurisdictions). The cases in these
reform jurisdictions hold that pollution liability should not be apportioned, because it is
impractical to divide the harm. The burden of apportionment should shift to the defendant,
because it is often difficult for the plaintiff to prove the proportion of damages caused by each
polluter. Apportionment need not be exact, though; a rough guess based on the volume of
each polluter's contribution is adequate. See Price, supra note 90, at 352-53. In many Superfund
cases, the government has sufficient information to apportion liability on the basis of each
party's percentage volume contribution of waste. Id. at 353.
97. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983). See supra notes
42-47 and accompanying text.
98. In Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the United States Supreme Court
held that federal courts must apply the law of the state, except in matters governed by the
federal Constitution or by acts of Congress. Id. at 78. The Chem-Dyne court stated that it was
not compelled to apply state law to apportion liability because the case was based on federal
law. 572 F. Supp. at 808. Consequently, the court concluded that a uniform federal law should
be created to govern the scope of liability under CERCLA. Id. at 809.
99. The remarks of Senator Randolph about joint and several liability do not suggest
whether federal or state common law principles should apply. State law doctrines that apportion
pollution damages arguably apply to CERCLA cases, especially in view of the deletion of the
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The Shore Realty district court failed to support its election of the Chem-
Dyne/Restatement approach to joint and several liability,' °° against the
modified approach of apportionment set forth in United States v. A & F
Materials Co., Inc.0 1 The district court refused to impose joint and several
liability on summary judgment, although it raised the problem briefly in
dicta. Unfortunately, the district court cited both Chem-Dyne and A & F
Materials interchangeably. The court cited Chem-Dyne to support its holding
that Shore Realty ran no risk of multiple liability because the court could
assess each defendant's liability to avoid that result. '1 Contrary to the district
court's interpretation of Chem-Dyne, however, the Chem-Dyne court im-
posed joint and several liability rigidly and did not leave room for appor-
tionment of damages.' 3 Therefore, under the Chem-Dyne approach, Shore
Realty could be held to multiple liability if the harm were indivisible. The
district court also cited A & F Materials to support its conclusion that all
responsible parties need not be joined in an action under CERCLA. Unfor-
tunately, the court did not distinguish the A & F Materials approach to joint
and several liability from the more rigid Chem-Dyne approach.'"
The Second Circuit's decision in Shore Realty failed to clarify the district
court's ambiguous dicta about joint and several liability. Accordingly, the
Shore Realty court does not resolve whether joint and several liability should
be applied in all CERCLA cases. Shore Realty knew of the existence of the
hazardous waste at the site prior to its purchase and subsequently failed to
explicit federal provision for joint and several liability. On the other hand, the application of
state law may result in a non-uniform application of the federal CERCLA statute because of
differences among state nuisance laws. See Note, Joint and Several Liability, supra note 34, at
1166-73.
The Chem-Dyne court stated that a uniform federal rule is consistent with the legislative
history and policies of CERCLA. 572 F. Supp. at 809. But one federal court found that some
amount of uniformity could be achieved under a rule of apportionment. See United States v.
A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Ill. 1984). The court stated:
[Tlhe legislative history of CERCLA does not contain evidence of Congressional
intent as to the content of the federal common law of liability .... Under the
Restatement approach, any defendant who could not prove its contribution would
be jointly and severally liable. This result must be avoided because both Houses of
Congress were concerned about the issue of fairness, and joint and several liability
is extremely harsh and unfair if it is imposed on a defendant who contributed only
a small amount of waste to a site.
Id. at 1256. It would also be unfair to impose joint and several liability on successor owners
of waste sites that were not involved in the disposal of hazardous wastes.
100. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text. The Chem-Dyne approach imposes rigid
joint and several liability when the harm is indivisible.
101. 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Ill. 1984). The A & F Materials decision imposes joint and
several liability but allows apportionment based upon set criteria. See supra text accompanying
notes 49-51.
102. 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1432.
103. See supra text accompanying note 46.
104. 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1432.
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take adequate precautions against the resultant releases. 05 The easy facts of
this case deprived the court of the opportunity and necessity to discuss the
limitation of liability in closer cases, such as when the site owner acts in
good faith or is unaware of the presence of hazardous wastes.l°0 Nevertheless,
Shore Realty's liability should have been apportioned under the A & F
Materials approach, since Shore Realty was not responsible for the presence
of the wastes on the site. Its liability could have been limited to the extent
that its negligent treatment of the wastes led to further releases. 7
IV. IMPACT
The Shore Realty decision illustrates how the courts must balance the
CERCLA interest of holding some responsible party liable for release of
toxic wastes, and the inequity of imposing joint and several liability on a
successor owner of a waste site. The court of appeals held Shore Realty
jointly and severally liable for the release of all wastes on the site. 0 The
court's judgment was influenced by the defendant's awareness, prior to its
purchase, of the waste problem on the site and the defendant's failure to
treat or secure the wastes. The decision leaves open a possible limit to
liability for site owners who are unaware of the presence of hazardous wastes
at sites prior to their purchase.' °9
Under the Shore Realty decision,"0 a new owner of a waste site cannot
avoid liability merely by asserting lack of knowledge of the presence of
hazardous wastes. Shore Realty imposes on potential purchasers of real
105. See supra text accompanying notes 53-56.
106. It is not clear from the facts whether Shore Realty acted in bad faith in this case.
Apparently, Shore Realty knew of the condition of the site when it acquired title. This leaves
the problem of Shore Realty's intent: was Shore Realty acting in bad faith, attempting to
acquire cheap land at the risk of liability for the environmental problems, or was Shore Realty
operating on an honest assumption that it had no responsibility for the environmental conditions
at the site? Regardless of Shore Realty's intentions, it is not equitable to hold land purchasers
liable for the entire cleanup of conditions they did not create, without any indication of bad
faith conduct to justify such liability. Had Shore Realty refused to purchase the land, they
could not have been held liable for the cleanup costs. To hold Shore Realty liable for the entire
cleanup of the site because it went ahead with the purchase is unjust.
107. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 64-67.
109. If the court's holding in Shore Realty is combined with the court's holding in United
States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1577 (D.S.D.
1984), a lessee of a site may be responsible for cleaning up hazardous wastes, even though the
lessee may not have been directly involved with the disposal or release of the waste. In South
Carolina Recycling, the lessee was also an operator/arranger, and transporter of hazardous
wastes, and the court's conclusion that it was liable as an "owner" may have been influenced
by such factors. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
110. See supra text accompanying note 66. The court stated that liability was not avoided
merely because the site owner purchased the waste site after the dumping of hazardous waste
had ceased. 759 F.2d at 1045.
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
estate a duty to conduct environmental investigations of suspect sites."' If
hazardous wastes are found, the purchasers must exercise due care and take
adequate precautions to treat and secure the wastes. Arguably, such obli-
gations and duties are consistent with CERCLA's purpose of providing an
incentive for voluntary cleanups.' 2 However, when coupled with the impo-
sition of joint and several liability, the effect on potentially liable parties is
harsher than Congress anticipated or intended." 3 Parties with deep pockets
will be singled out in CERCLA actions," 4 and the cost of environmental
cleanups will not be spread among the industry as Congress intended." 5
Successor owners of waste sites, and even parties who disposed of some
Ill. See Angelo, supra note 74, at 117-20 (suggested questions for potential site purchasers
to ask of sellers to uncover the existence and extent of hazardous waste problems).
112. Mr. Lee M. Thomas, EPA Administrator, spoke before the Senate Judiciary Committee
on Administrative Law and Government Relations and stated that "strict, joint and several
liability ... has been an important factor in EPA's success in getting private parties to undertake
cleanup actions voluntarily at Superfund sites." 16 Env't Rep. (BNA) 474 (1985).
113. See Note, Joint and Several Liability, supra note 34, at 1184-85, which supports the
argument that joint and several liability is the best approach to achieve the goals and purposes
of CERCLA. The author suggests four possible approaches to the allocation of liability under
CERCLA: I) impose liability only upon those defendants shown to have caused harm; 2) follow
the common law rule, imposing joint and several liability for indivisible harm; 3) apportion
the total costs of abatement and cleanup among defendants by a prescribed formula, based on
estimated contributions or market share; 4) apply joint and several liability to all defendants
in all cases. The author concludes that the fourth approach, the application of joint and several
liability in all cases, would best serve Congress's intent to facilitate the recovery of cleanup
costs under CERCLA. The author rejected apportionment of liability, because of the difficulties
with developing an appropriate formula and with proving causation. The author stated that a
rule of apportionment would "most likely lead to uneven application of the rule, thereby
reducing the ability of the potential defendants to predict their future liability and lessening
the incentive impact of the rule." Id. at 1192.
This argument against apportionment can be challenged on four grounds. First, it is ques-
tionable whether joint and several liability provides the strongest incentives for voluntary
observance of CERCLA. See infra notes 118-37 and accompanying text. Second, the author
inaccurately implies that only a federal standard of joint and several liability avoids choice of
law difficulties and discourages forum shopping. However, a federal rule that apportioned
liability would also avoid these difficulties. See supra note 99. Third, the author states that the
insurance industry will not insure against liability without a uniform federal rule. Contrary to
this claim, insurance has in fact become virtually unavailable since the application of joint and
several liability. See infra notes 130-37 and accompanying text. Finally, the author states that
the joint and several liability standard provides needed uniformity in the CERCLA area.
Uniformity promotes negotiations between the EPA and potential responsible parties, because
those parties can more accurately assess what their liability will be in a CERCLA suit. Again,
a federal rule that ordered apportionment of damages would serve this purpose. Moreover,
potentially responsible parties can better assess their liability if they know it will be apportioned
based on designated factors, as opposed to the uncertainty engendered by joint and several
liability.
114. See Price, supra note 90, at 341.
115. See Note, Is Joint and Several Liability the Answer, supra note 3, at 119. See also
Grad, supra note 4, at 12 (citing S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1980), for the
proposition that it is more equitable to fund CERCLA primarily from fees paid by industry).
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hazardous wastes legally, are exposed to sole liability for the cleanup of the
entire site." 6 Coupled with recent developments in the fields of contribution,
EPA settlement policy, and pollution insurance law, some potentially liable
parties face inordinate financial risks." '
A. Contribution Rights
Courts generally have found a right to contribution among liable parties
under CERCLA." 8 However, current Superfund reauthorization proposals
have included an amendment to CERCLA that prohibits contribution suits
until after a judgment is rendered."19 Furthermore, the current EPA policy
on settlements under CERCLA provides that if parties settle with the gov-
ernment under a judicially-approved settlement agreement, they will be
protected from later third-party suits by non-settling contributors. 1 0
These prospective limitations on contribution drastically affect liability
under CERCLA. Parties susceptible to CERCLA liability must weigh the
risks of "sitting back," and waiting to be sued, against the costs of settling
a CERCLA claim to preserve the right to seek contribution against co-
contributors in the future. Potentially liable parties may agree to share in
response costs in order to avoid an uncertain CERCLA action in the future
that could potentially impose greater liability.
These considerations make judicial efforts to temper the harshness of joint
and several liability with a right of contribution less appealing than it appears.
If contribution is prohibited until after judgment, responsible parties will
have to incur the costs of subsequent litigation with no assurance of success.
B. Settlement
Voluntary settlement and cleanup efforts are a vital source of funds to
finance the cleanup of the environment.' 2 ' Recently the EPA published an
interim CERCLA settlement policy to respond to suggestions from potentially
responsible parties (PRPs) that past settlement policies fostered litigation
and discouraged voluntary cleanup actions. The policy recognizes private
party negotiations as an essential component in the national cleanup effort.
116. See Angelo, supra note 74, at 107.
117. See infra notes 118-37 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Wehner v. Syntex Corp., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1373 (E.D. Mo. 1985);
United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984);
United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. III. 1984); United States v.
Ward, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1235 (E.D.N.C. 1984); United States v. South Carolina
Recycling & Disposal Inc., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1577 (D.S.C. 1984); United States v.
Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
119. See Note, Right to Contribution, supra note 27, at 367 (contribution actions belong in
a subsequent, separate trial to avoid delay in the primary suit).
120. EPA Proposed Interim CERCLA Settlement Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 5034, 5039 (1985).
121. Id. at 5035.
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The policy adopts the view that joint and several liability will spur successful
settlement negotiations. 2' However, the lack of finality under EPA policy
for parties who seek to settle inhibits such negotiations. 23
Administrative practice by the EPA under CERCLA highlights the agency's
disinclination to free responsible parties from liability. The EPA policy
recognizes that some parties should be released from contribution by settle-
ment in "appropriate situations."' 24 The policy leaves the final issue of
release and contribution to the courts. The EPA advises courts to devise a
rule that discharges good faith settlers from all liability for contribution to
other tortfeasors.'25 Until the courts adopt such a rule, however, the EPA
proposes to release only a limited number of parties from contribution after
settlement. 16
The EPA also intends to release few past or present site owners from
liability under CERCLA. The EPA's policy states that such releases will be
granted based upon the Agency's confidence in the negotiated remedy. 27
Any such release must include a reopener clause which preserves the gov-
ernment's right to seek additional cleanup actions and costs. 21 ' An acceptable
122. Id. See also United States v. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (one of
the first cases holding responsible parties jointly and severally liable under CERCLA). Chem-
Dyne was ultimately settled in response to the government's cleanup suit, involving 158 parties
and a $19 million settlement. According to F. Henry Habicht II, assistant attorney general for
the EPA's Land and Natural Resource Division, the parties to the settlement agreement "drew
the outlines of that agreement almost immediately after Judge Rubin decided that the standard
of joint and several liability could be applied in Superfund cases." 16 Env't Rep. 267 (1985).
123. See infra notes 124-28 and accompanying text. See also Kowalski, Why Can't You Just
Settle These Superfund Cases Once and For All? 15 Tm LAW. BRIEF 20-26 (April 30, 1985)
(critical discussion of the EPA's settlement policy and suggested revisions to provide finality in
settlement agreements).
124. EPA Proposed Interim CERCLA Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 5034, 5035-36 (1985).
125. Id. at 5039. Such a federal rule would follow § 4 of the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act. By providing that good faith settlers are discharged from all liability for
contribution to any other tortfeasor, the Tortfeasors Act eliminates the need for contribution
protection. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 4, 12 U.L.A. 56 (1975). See
also Note, Right to Contribution, supra note 27, at 361-63 (complete discussion of the Uniform
Act).
126. EPA Proposed Interim CERCLA Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 5034 (1985):
VI. Contribution Protection
Explicit contribution protection clauses are generally not appropriate unless liability can
be clearly allocated, so that the risk of reapportionment by a judge in any future
action would be minimal.
Inclusion should depend on case-by-case consideration of the law which is likely to be
applied.
The Agency will be more willing to consider contribution protection in settlements that
provide substantially all the costs of cleanup.
Id. at 5039.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 5039-40. The EPA can also address future problems at sites, by enforcing a
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release must also preserve the government's authority to seek contribution
from settling parties to finance the correction of presently unknown or
undetected conditions at the waste site.
29
In view of the limitations in the EPA's settlement policy, PRPs who
negotiate a settlement and participate in a private cleanup action may still
be liable for future cleanup costs under section 9607. Furthermore, the
EPA's caution in granting releases, because of uncertainty in a site's con-
dition, may hold parties susceptible to liability five or ten years in the future.
Many PRPs are in this position today. Although the interim settlement policy
represents the government's effort to encourage and facilitate settlements,
the concessions granted to PRPs are too limited and inadequate to provide
sufficient finality. If voluntary settlements are to become more appealing to
PRPs as a way to avoid the risk of joint and several liability, the government
needs to develop stronger release and contribution protection provisions.
Such provisions would protect PRPs that negotiate in good faith from future
liability and would promote voluntary remedies for the cleanup of hazardous
wastes.
C. Insurance
The liability standards upheld in Shore Realty have significantly impacted
the ability of PRPs to insure against environmental risks. In support of the
decree or order, instead of acting under a reopener clause. The expansiveness or stringency of
a release in settlement documents will depend on a variety of circumstances: the threat posed
by unknown or undetected conditions and the discovery of previously undisclosed risks. Release
clauses are also subject to the following limitations:
NI. Releases from Liability
A release or covenant may be given only to the PRP providing the consideration for the
release.
The release or covenant must not cover any claims other than those involved in the case.
The release must not address any criminal matter.
Releases for partial cleanups that do not extend to the entire site must be limited to the
work actually completed.
Federal claims for natural resource damages should not be released without the approval
of Federal trustees.
Responsible parties must release any related claims against the United States, including the
Hazardous Substances Response Fund.
Where the cleanup is to be performed by the PRPs, the release or covenant should normally
become effective only upon the completion of the cleanup (or phase of cleanup) in
a manner satisfactory to EPA.
Release clauses should be drafted as covenants not to sue, rather than releases from liability,
where this form may be necessary to protect the legal rights of the Federal Gov-
ernment.
Id. at 5040.
129. Id. The EPA will assume the response costs in future cases that do not pose an imminent
and substantial risk to human health, if remedial actions by the PRPs were adequately
maintained. Id. at 5044.
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PRPs' position, several state courts have recently held that the release of
hazardous wastes constitutes an "accident," as required under the definition
of an "occurrence" under a Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) pol-
icy. 3 Such decisions remove the release of waste from pollution exclusion
clauses, which exclude coverage of gradual and nonsudden pollution damage.
Consequently, parties with CGL policies may seek some relief from cleanup
liability through insurance coverage.
Such relief will be short-lived under CERCLA. The insurance industry has
responded to the rulings of the state courts by writing new pollution exclusion
clauses that deny coverage for both accidental and gradual pollution. 3 ' The
industry argues that the court decisions upset "the risk predicators that were
the keystones of designing and pricing" the insurance coverage.' As current
CGL policies expire, PRPs will no longer be able to renew them. Instead,
companies will have to purchase separate environmental impairment liability
(EIL) insurance. Such policies are more limited and costly than CGLs and
are issued on a claims-made basis rather than an occurrence basis., 3 The
130. Pepper Indus. v. Home Ins. Co., 67 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 134 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1977);
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Martin, 126 Ill. App. 3d 94, 467 N.E.2d 287 (1st Dist. 1984); Jackson
Township v. American Home Ins. Co., 8 Chem. & Radiation Waste Lit. Rep. 646 (N.J. Super.
Ct. 1984); Jackson Township Mun. Util. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 186 N.J.
Super. 156, 451 A.2d 990 (1982); Lansco v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 138 N.J. Super.
275, 350 A.2d 520 (1975), aff'd, 145 N.J. Super. 433, 368 A.2d 363 (1976); Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Klock Oil Co., 73 A.D.2d 486, 426 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1980); Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Bagley, 64 A.D.2d 1014, 409 N.Y.S.2d 294 (1978); United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Van's Westlake
Union, Inc., 34 Wash. App. 708, 664 P.2d 1262 (1983). But see American States Ins. Co. v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 587 F. Supp. 1549 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (release of toxic materials is
continuous, not sudden or accidental, and therefore does not fall within definition of "occur-
rence"); Barmet of Indiana, Inc. v. Security Ins. Group, 425 N.E.2d 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981)
(where pollution control system malfunctioned on regular and frequent basis, discharge of
emissions was not "sudden and accidental" within meaning of policy). See also Hall, supra
note 92, at 618 (discussing insurance availability).
131. Richard P. Kropp, vice president of Shand, Morahan and Co., Inc., one of the major
environmental impairment liability (EIL) underwriters, stated that "reinsurers don't want
pollution risks because 'they fear the U.S. Courts'." Finlayson, EIL Market Crumbles Further
as Shand, Morahan Pulls Out, Bus. INs., Jan. 28, 1985, at 2. EIL experts argue that many
courts have taken an overly broad interpretation of coverage in pollution cases. Id. According
to Leslie Cheek, vice president for Federal Affairs, Crum & Foster, the collapse of the pollution
insurance market resulted from court rulings that made it virtually impossible for underwriters
to determine with any certainty their future liability under a policy. 16 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1667
(1985). See also Atkeson, Superfund and the Pollution Exclusion, Bus. INs., Nov. 5, 1984, at
26 (CGL policies leave underwriters with large environmental exposure).
132. 16 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2124 (1985) (Americana Insurance Ass'n President T. Lawrence
Jones speaking at a Senate panel hearing on insurance issues under CERCLA).
133. "Claims-made" policies provide coverage for claims that arise and are made during the
annual policy period. Insurers are only responsible for those claims that are first filed during
the policy period. "Occurrence" policies cover damages that result from incidents that occur
while the policy is in effect, regardless of when the claim arising from the incident is made.
Therefore, under an "occurrence" policy, insurers may be liable for any losses which occurred
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EIL insurance market is small because of the insurance industry's inability
to assess liability risks with any accuracy. Also, the insurance industry intends
to withhold further EIL insurance until joint and several liability is abolished
under CERCLA. 3 4 It is predicted that if Congress does not amend the
current standards of liability under CERCLA, the hazardous waste industry
will become uninsurable.13' Such a result would have a disasterous effect on
PRPs: they would have to bear the burden of liability without the security
of insurance coverage. 3 6 This result cannot be squared with the government's
desire to ensure that PRPs are financially responsible. 1 '
CONCLUSION
The presence of hazardous wastes in the environment poses a danger to
human health. Congress placed the burden on the chemical industry to
finance the long and expensive cleanup warranted by years of neglect.
Although the decision to place the financial burden on industry is defensible,
the Shore Realty court's construction of CERCLA's liability provisions does
not equitably distribute the cleanup costs amog responsible parties., The
during the policy, regardless of how long after the expiration date of the policy the claim is
made. Atkeson, supra note 131, at 26. A prerequisite to EIL coverage is an independent risk
assessment of the facility, which usually costs between $2,000-$16,000 per site. Furthermore,
EIL policies usually do not cover punitive damages, maintenance costs, fines or penalties.
Angelo, supra note 74, at 117. Jack McGraw, acting assistant administrator for EPA's Office
of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, speaking to the Bureau of National Affairs (BNA),
stated that the insurance situation is "particularly acute for small contractors that cannot afford
the high premiums paid by larger companies that can spread insurance costs over a greater
number of insured persons or individual cleanup projects." 16 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1661 (1985).
134. See Finlayson, supra note 131, at 2. See also King, Where High-Risk Companies Run
for Coverage, Bus. WK., July 22, 1985, at 72 (to obtain adequate pollution liability coverage,
many companies are combining resources to create their own insurance companies). The
American Insurance Association's (AIA) draft recommendations on reauthorizing Superfund
stated that liability under CERCLA "has evolved into an unfair set of rules which undermine
the notions of equity and fair play at the heart of American jurisprudence." 15 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 1842 (1985). David R. Connolly, AIA vice president for liability, told BNA that "the
current superfund liability system has nearly killed the market for this type of [environmental)
insurance." Id.
135. Finlayson, supra note 131, at 2.
136. Open-ended liability may cause some small companies to go into bankruptcy, and
lending sources may be diminished if lenders cannot be assured of a fixed-dollar limit on
liability or no liability at all. 16 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 519 (1985) (testimony of small company
executives at a hearing of the House Small Business Committee).
137. Section 9608 provides that owners and operators must "establish and maintain evidence
of financial responsibility consistent with the degree and duration of risk associated with the
production, transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous substances." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9608(b)(1) (1982). Specific provisions in section 9608, however, make it unattractive for a
commercial insurer to underwrite such requirements, and Congress, recognizing this problem,
called for a study to determine whether private insurance would be available. The study
concluded that commercial insurers were not prepared to write policies in this area. Hall, supra
note 92, at 616-17.
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court's application of joint and several liability casts complete responsibility
on remote parties, including successor owners of waste sites who have made
reasonable efforts to inspect and clean their property of wastes. Moreover,
the mechanisms that responsible parties can use to minimize their liability-
contribution, settlement, and insurance-cannot overcome the burden of
joint and several liability.
The statutory language of CERCLA, as well as the legislative history,
leaves open a fairer means of distributing risk and liability among responsible
parties. Damages should be apportioned among parties with some view to
fault. This was the approach taken by the district court in United States v.
A & F Materials. In most instances, environmental surveys can help assess
relative liability. When certain responsible parties are not available, their
share of the damages can be carried by the available defendants. An appor-
tionment scheme, if applied to jointly and severally liable parties, will not
defeat the legislative purposes behind CERCLA. The government still need
not bring an action against every potentially responsible party before cleanup
measures are initiated. Such a policy would ensure that suits are brought
against those whose involvement is substantial, instead of those whose
contribution is insignificant.
Finally, the apportionment of liability will enable the insurance industry
to provide the coverage necessary to finance waste cleanups. Apportionment
of liability according to the criteria in A & F Materials will not diminish the
incentive of responsible parties to voluntarily engage in cleanup actions or
settlements, if adequate settlement policies are developed to insure finality.
Parties will remain jointly and severally liable, and the cooperation of
responsible parties with governmental agencies can be factored into the
apportioning scheme to provide the necessary incentive to participate vol-
untarily in the cleanup.
Kathleen Paravola
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